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"DEMOCRACY IN A NEW AMERICA": SOME
REFLECTIONS ON A TITLE
SANFORD LEVINSON*
Whatever the quality of the contributions to this Symposium,
which is certainly very high, they nonetheless exemplify a certain
tunnel vision-or propensity to be confined within conceptual
boxes-that ill serves us as we try to determine the future of
American democracy. In particular,we should become more
comparative in our focus. Academics should also lessen the hold
that the Supreme Court appearsto have with regard to shaping the
academic agenda. Finally, we must be far more willing than we
have been to confront the possibility that the United States
Constitution is itself significantly flawed, though we are
discouragedfrom any such thoughts by the near impossibility of
actually being able to change that document. We thus have a
dangerous incentive to pretend that there is no danger attached to
adheringto the constitutionalstatus quo.
I want to offer some very general comments on two central
assumptions that not only appear to underlie our particular
Symposium, but, more importantly, also serve as the foundation of
almost all discussions on the general topic of the state of American
democracy in the new millennium. Many such discussions, of course,
have been provoked by the electoral fiasco of 2000 and the significant
attention thus engendered on the adequacy of our democratic
Perhaps inevitably, though, our discussions are
institutions.
structured by a variety of too often unexamined assumptions whose
acceptance helps to constitute what we sometimes refer to as thinking
"within the box." As interesting and provocative as all of the
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Regents Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas. Given
the somewhat critical tone of what follows, I want to emphasize that I join the other
participants in expressing my gratitude to the editors of the North Carolina Law Review
for their efforts in organizing, and then carrying out, a splendid symposium. I am also
grateful for their allowing me to deviate from my original charge, which was to comment
on Professor Terry Smith's interesting paper on ways we imagine "equality," first when
thinking about campaign finance and then with regard to the drawing of legislative
districts, and instead to offer some observations on how we might organize our thinking
about "Democracy in a New America."
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contributions to this Symposium are, I believe they might have been
even more so had they gone more "outside the box."
THE NEED TO LOOK BEYOND OUR SHORES
The first assumption is handily illustrated by the title itself, which
focuses on "a New America." To be sure, there is vital need for
fearless examination of the state of American democracy; the
question is how that examination can best be carried out? As a
matter of fact, a world-wide discussion of the meaning of democracy
has been taking place for at least the last fifteen years, not least
because of the "transitions" that have taken place, most dramatically
(but not exclusively) in Eastern Europe, South America, and South
Africa from authoritarian (or worse) political systems to ones that
aspire to achieving some recognition as "liberal democracies."' Why
shouldn't any discussion of "Democracy in a New America" be
informed by simultaneous discussions of 'Democracy in a New South
Africa" or "Democracy in a New Hungary" and so on? Is it really the
case that Americans, concerned about the state of democracy in the
United States, have nothing to learn from how these countries are
grappling with such common enterprises as organizing elections and
attempting to structure "representative" legislative or executive
institutions? These questions, of course, are rhetorical, for the
answers seem entirely obvious. To take the easiest example, we
might well spend less time obsessing over the issue of
gerrymandering-a central concern of this conference inasmuch as

congressional districting in North Carolina appears now to be a
permanent part of the Supreme Court's docket-if we followed the
example (and wisdom) of the rest of the world, which, save for Great
Britain, relies far less on single-member, territorially-based districting
than does the United States.3 Americans tend to be notoriously
2. See, e.g.,

CONSTITUTIONALISM

& DEMOCRACY:

TRANSITIONS IN THE

CONTEMPORARY WORLD 3-84, 267-348 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993);
TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE:

COMPARATIVE PERSPECrIVES passim

(Guillermo O'Donnell et al. eds., 1986); see also CONSTITUTIONS IN DEMOCRATIC
POLITICSpassim (Vernon Bogdanor ed., 1988).
3. See CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 15-30,41-

52, 73-81 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984); AREND LIJPHART,
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A STUDY OF TWENTY-SEVEN
DEMOCRACIES, 1945-1990 passim (1994); AREND LuPHART, PATTERNS OF
DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES

passim (1999). There is an excellent short summary of types of electoral systems in
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD M. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRuCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 719-22 (1998)

[hereinafter LAW OF DEMOCRACY].
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parochial in their interests, and I am afraid that this is certainly true
when one turns to the discussion of how best to structure the polity.
We should work to overcome that parochialism by becoming more
aware of alternatives to the way we do things here in the United
States and, therefore, becoming, as well, better equipped to challenge
the "conventional wisdom" that supports our practices.
Thus, my own candidate for the world's best electoral system, at
least on formal grounds, is Germany's, which manages to enjoy the
benefits undoubtedly connected with single-member, territoriallybased districting while, at the same time, controlling for the equally
undoubted problems that are attached to such systems.4 The solution
is relatively simple: only half the Bundestag, the lower House of the
German legislature, are elected through single-member districts; the
remaining half are assigned through a system of proportional
representation, based on the nationwide vote, that includes a
"correction factor" that compensates for a party that, say, achieved
48% of the popular vote but, because of inevitable "clumping" of
support geographically, gained only 42% of the geographically-based
seats. Enough seats are assigned at the second-stage so that the
overall representation in the Bundestag will be 48%. It should be
obvious that there is far less significance attached to the particular
shape of each district than is the case in the United States. The whole
point of gerrymandering, after all, is to gain more seats than one
would get if proportional representation were the norm, and,
concomitantly, to make sure that those who are the victims of the
gerrymander are left with fewer seats than might otherwise be the
case.
As my former colleague, Sam Issacharoff, once joined in putting
it, in what remains one of the very best articles written in the
aftermath of Shaw v. Reno,5 we have established a system in the
United States by which public officials are empowered to choose their
voters, as against the promise, in a representative democracy, that it
will in fact be the voters who choose their representatives.6 We treat
this pathology as built into our political system, capable of little, if
any, reining in other than through the blunderbuss approach signified
4. See LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 3, at 721-22.
5. 509 U.S. 650 (1993).
6. "In a democratic society, the purpose of voting is to allow the electors to select
their governors. Once a decade, however, that process is inverted, and the governors and
their political agents are permitted to select their electors." T. Alexander Aleinikoff &
Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines after Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 588,588 (1993).
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by what almost everyone along the political spectrum regards as the
Court's clumsy and unsatisfying attempts to limit "racial" (though not
any other) gerrymandering. It is sadly illuminating that even Lani
Guinier, who is acutely aware of the need to think "outside the box"
about the way we organize political representation, 7 devotes none of
her book, subtitled Fundamental Fairness in Representative
Democracy, to consideration of what might be learned from looking
beyond our shores.
One obviously need not agree with me about the glories of the
German system, which, no doubt, would manifest some of its own
deficiencies if subjected to close examination. But the point is that
any really serious grappling with the issues raised by our
symposium-and giving all due credit to the excellence of the
presentations and ensuing discussion-requires a much greater
willingness to look beyond our own borders than has traditionally
been evident in the American legal academy.
The limits of the Symposium, organized by a devoted group of
students whose energy impressed everyone who visited Chapel Hill,
reflect, no doubt, the limits of the view of law taught them. I hasten
to add that this is no criticism of the University of North Carolina,
but, rather, of my own school, the University of Texas and, if truth be
known, of basically all legal education as it is currently conducted.
Although almost all schools offer some courses on "comparative
law"-and Mark Tushnet and Vicki Jackson of the Georgetown Law
School have recently published an excellent casebook, Comparative
Constitutional Law 8 -such courses have not yet become truly
significant parts of the curriculum. They remain "fringe" courses
within the consciousness of most students and, equally, the students'
professors. Consider the fact that almost no required first-year
courses ever pay significant (if any) attention to the ways that similar
issues are handled overseas.9 Yet, as Rudyard Kipling once wrote,
7. See, e.g., LANi GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 71-119 (1994). A listing of many basic
works comparing electoral systems can be found in Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation
of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 634,638 n.11 (2000).
8. VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1999). It should be noted, though, that only two pages are devoted to consideration of
"electoral systems." See id. at 713-14.
9. As both the teacher of such a course on constitutional law and the co-editor of the
casebook that is used in the course, I can sadly testify that I and my co-editors are not
exempt from my own critique. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING (4th ed. 2000). As a matter of fact, our casebook includes very little
material on the constitutional law of elections, in part because the field has become
sufficiently complex that it is, we believe, basically impossible to teach in an
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"[W]hat should they know of England who only England know,"'"
which Jack Balkin and I have elsewhere used as the basis for
criticizing the insularities of American treatments of law." One is
sadly deficient in one's knowledge of American law, especially with
regard to organizing the basic political process, if one knows only that
body of law, precisely because it encourages us to continue denying in
effect that there really are other ways to organize those processes.
Indeed, to make the point as strongly as possible: it would be
very healthy for Americans to confront the fact that relatively few
political systems throughout the world, whether "developed"
democracies or countries "in transition" to such a status, have looked
on our basic institutional structures and found them worthy of
emulation. 2 To be sure, our insistence on the importance of written
constitutions has been highly influential, as is almost certainly the
case as well with regard to the importance of written guarantees of
individual (and, in many countries, social) rights. But that influence is
significantly diminished if one asks about basic structure, such as the
degree of independence, or "separation," between legislature and
executive or the methods of election by which rulers are chosen.
With regard to such issues, the French, German, and Spanish
constitutions collectively have been far more influential than our own.
DOCTRINAL CAGES AND CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITY
My second observation is linked with the first insofar as it, too,
focuses on an assumption that serves to fetter our sense of
constitutional possibility. That assumption is that discussions of
constitutional possibility must invariably focus on the doctrines
enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court. This means, for example,
that any discussion of, say, the use of race or ethnicity in drawing
legislative boundary lines must necessarily be based on Shaw v. Reno
and its progeny. As with the lack of comparative focus, I certainly

"introductory" course. As noted earlier, Issacharoff et al. include helpful discussion of
comparative materials toward the end of their casebook, though one does not know, of
course, how often teachers using the casebook assign them and discuss them with their
students. See LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supranote 3.
10. Kipling, The English Flag, in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 298 (3d ed.
1979).
11. See Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1606 (1991); see also Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional
Canons, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1005 n.134 (1998) (criticizing Justice Scalia's
parochialism concerning the utility of comparative materials).
12. See Ackerman, supra note 7, at 637 n.10. Ironically, it appears that the country
most imitative of the United States is Russia. See id.
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understand this in the sense of being able to explain it. To make the
easiest point, if our focus, either as legal academics, law students, or
practicing lawyers is simply trying to figure out political and litigation
strategies with regard to the spate of lawsuits that will undoubtedly
follow in the wake of the new round of redrawing district lines, then
one is well advised to pay attention to the views of the current
majority of the Supreme Court.
But, of course, there are other questions that can profitably be
asked besides predicting the response of the current Court to certain
legislative outcomes, especially if one is a legal academic presumably
charged to take a broader perspective than that of the actively
litigating lawyer. Our fixation on the Supreme Court as the fount of
constitutional learning serves to deprive us of the ability to say,
forthrightly, "the Supreme Court is wrong in fundamental ways, and
our emphasis should be on how most effectively to encourage the
reversal of direction." In order to make such arguments, though, one
must liberate oneself from the iron cage of doctrinal analysis and be
willing to look to other approaches to the Constitution. As my
colleague Philip Bobbitt has long argued, there are many
"modalities" of constitutional analysis, and doctrine, with its reliance
13
on precedents, is only one of them.
One reason that some give for emphasizing doctrine is that the
Supreme Court is indeed, as it often describes itself, the "ultimate
interpreter" of the Constitution, 4 so that whatever the Supreme
Court says just is what the Constitution means. There is, as I have
argued elsewhere, 5 no good reason to accept the Court's
exaggerated, even megalomaniacal, sense of its own privileged status
as constitutional interpreter. 6 Indeed, given that there is no reason to
believe that members of the current Court, trained only in the
techniques of legal analysis and quite devoid themselves of any
meaningful experience in the electoral process itself, have any
genuine insight into how best to structure the electoral system, it is
13. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11-22 (1991).
14. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 37-46 (1988) (delineating the
difference between "protestant" and "catholic" approaches to institutional authority to
interpret the Constitution).
15. Id. at 47-50.
16. This megalomania is well illustrated, of course, in Bush v. Gore,121 S. Ct. 525,532
(2000), but all too many other recent examples could be offered, including City of Boerne
v. Flores,521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), and U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000), both of
which stand for the proposition that the Court, and the Court alone, is authorized to
decide what could count as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to
authorizing congressional action under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
current Supreme Court is by far the most "papalist" in our history.
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especially important to be skeptical of the adequacy of judicial
doctrine to provide cogent answers to truly complex dilemmas.
It is, of course, unrealistic to believe that the Supreme Court will
lose its special role as constitutional interpreter. But we can, perhaps,
work to tame its excesses if we pay more attention to the Constitution
as we believe it to be best interpreted and less attention to parsing
every paragraph of judicial opinions that should be overruled as soon
as possible. Even if the Court remains untamed, though, at least we
can work to diminish its legitimacy and empower the general
community, including our own students, to take issue with its
analyses. This would, perhaps, help to empower those of us who
strongly disagree with the Court's current directions to work actively
to discourage the appointment or confirmation of successor judges
who seem eager, or even likely, to continue implementing its
handiwork. Successfully to defend such a strategy, however, requires
a systematic critique of that handiwork, in effect its delegitimation by
redescribing it as "politics" or "ideology" rather than simply "what
the Constitution means (because the Supreme Court says so)."
CONSTITUTIONAL CAGES AND IMAGINATIVE POSSIBILIrY

It is not only the doctrinal structures imposed by the Supreme
The
Court that limit our sense of imaginative possibility.
Constitution itself serves to stifle us, to place us into boxes that
needlessly confine rather than necessarily serve to help implement
the inspiring vision of a "more perfect Union" spelled out in the
Preamble. Consider the fact, for example, that the recent election
exposed certain fault lines imposed by the Constitution, particularly
the Electoral College and the mechanism for breaking deadlocks in
the Electoral College elaborated in the Twelfth Amendment. 17 One
might believe that any discussion of "Democracy in a New America"
would ask if the institutional structures created by the Framers in
1787 (and modified by the 1804 Amendment) adequately serve our
present needs. If not, then presumably we might talk about the
desirability of changing them.
It is possible, of course, that America will continue to muddle
through future elections that occur within unchanged structures. If,
after all, George W. Bush has been so easily accepted by most
Americans as a legitimate occupant of the White House, in spite of
the irregularities of the process by which he got there, then, one is
17. As to the Twelfth Amendment, see Sanford Levinson & Ernest Young, Who's
Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?, 28 FLA. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
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tempted to say, Americans will accept just about anything. As Bobby
McFerrin might put it, then, the proper attitude is "Don't Worry, Be
Happy." If that's really the case, though, then there is simply no
rationale for having brought all of us to Chapel Hill to anguish about
the meaning of "Democracy in a New America," because, it turns out,
it will turn out to be almost exactly like "Democracy in Old
America," and everybody will be accepting of that reality. (Or, what
is more likely, and far more ominous, is that those who are
dissatisfied will be increasingly marginalized and left out of the
"official" political process.)
To put it mildly, I am disturbed by the remarkable complacence
that underlies such a view. One need not believe that the United
States of America is at all as fragile in 2001 as the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics was in, say, 1989, but one can learn from the
events of that earlier decade that amazing things can happen even in
apparently stable political systems. There is a certain wisdom in the
adage, "If it's not broken, don't fix it." But it's foolish to be almost
mindlessly self-confident either that there is no danger of breaks
occurring or, more to the point, that one should always wait until the
accident happens to begin thinking about how to fix it. No lawyer
would ever suggest to a client operating a dangerous activity to wait
for a disaster rather than engage in some pre-emptive measures that
would reduce the likelihood of the misfortune occurring in the first
place.
Unfortunately, though, we don't regularly engage in
conversations about what might be necessary to forestall foreseeable
problems. The reason, I believe, is not simply a proclivity on the part
of Americans, including legal academics, toward an often
unwarranted optimism or, far more ominously, a fear that being
labeled a critic of American verities will disqualify one from public
office."8 Rather, I think that a great deal of the explanation lies in
Article V of the Constitution, which makes it next to impossible to
18.
Thus Bruce Ackerman notes the importance of the "Lani Guinier Affair,"
Ackerman, supra note 7, 638 n.11, referring to the vicious attacks leveled on Professor
Guinier following her nomination by President Clinton to head the Civil Rights Division
of the Department of Justice. Just as important, I believe, was the way that the President,
when withdrawing her nomination, appeared to give credence to the attacks by completely
distancing himself from her views, which, he proclaimed, he had only recently read for the
first time. One could readily discern from this dismaying episode that it was basically
unpatriotic to suggest that American democracy might suffer from grievous flaws that
merited correction. As Ackerman writes, this treatment of Guinier "has been an
intellectual disaster that affects us all, regardless of our politics-marking the subject of
electoral reform off-limits for those scholars who harbor the thought of public service."
Id. This is true whether or not one agrees with Professor Guinier's specific views.
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amend the Constitution and serves as the ultimate iron cage. The
reason is the truly extraordinary majorities that those seeking to
change the document are required to gain. It is far more "sensible" to
talk about what might in fact be subject to change, whether doctrine
(which could, presumably, be changed by judges themselves) or
statutes (which could, presumably, be changed by passage of new
legislation). To talk about constitutional change sounds "academic"
in the most pejorative sense, little better than discussing how many
angels indeed could dance on the head of a pin. Although this
attitude might be readily understandable-who among us wants to be
dismissed as an "academic airhead"?-it may not always serve our
fellow citizens or our students.
It is possible, of course, that optimists are correct and that my
own fears are absolutely meritless. I would have far more confidence
in that conclusion, though, if I had a firmer sense that those who are
most knowledgeable about the electoral system, including the
participants in this excellent Symposium, had confronted the deepest,
most radical, critiques of that system and demonstrated why we
should continue to feel confident in disregarding them. All of us
learned as children that one should not be too quick to cry "Wolf" or
proclaim that the sky is falling. But the moral of the first story, after
all, is that the wolf did finally attack the child, who was disbelieved
because he had been precipitous before in his cries. Academics
should be slow to arouse, and especially to alarm, the public, lest they
(or we) indeed be dismissed as over-eager doomsayers or Chicken
Littles. But we should be just as fearful about reinforcing a tendency
toward parochial complacence that can be every bit as dangerous.
The last election was more than a fiasco. It should also be
treated as the equivalent of an alarm going off that signals the
presence of genuine dangers in the American system. Or, to switch
the metaphor slightly, we should realize that the canary has died, and
those of us left in the mine should make haste to understand what
threatens us. It is, of course, altogether understandable why neither
the present occupant of the White House nor the current majority of
the Supreme Court has the slightest incentive to admit to the
presence of, and therefore to confront, these dangers. This does not
excuse the rest of us, and a good place to begin our analysis is to look
outside our borders for any wisdom we might find there.
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